High on the list of priority problems Ukraine’s new government has inherited its foreign policies. As a matter of fact, in its totality the foreign political course of both “orange” governments supported by President Viktor Yushchenko was nothing but a never-ending train of problem.
The policies pursued since January 2005 resulted in the following:
1) A dramatic worsening of Ukraine’s relations with its closest neighbours and friendly states almost along the entire perimeter of its borders, including the Russian Federation (RF), Belorussia and the Trans-Dniester Moldavian Republic (TDMR). Its relations with Romania also remain tense due to debates on the ownership of Zmeiny Island;
2) A sharp worsening of relations with Turkmenistan, which quite like in the case of the RF had extremely negative consequences for the Ukrainian fuel and energy sector;
3) Decline of Ukraine’s authority in the eyes of the Slav population of the Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic due to its blockade organised by the Ukrainian government;
4) A most dangerous increase of U.S. influence on the government’s decision-making mechanisms;
5) A decline of Ukraine’s profile as an opinion-leader in the non-western world as a result of an almost total subordination of Ukraine’s policies to U.S. interests and the participation in U.S.-organised anti-Islamist and anti-Arab foreign policy acts;
6) The growth of circumspection of Ukraine on the part of the states of “the old” Europe, especially the most influential ones, including France, Germany, Spain and Italy as a result of the pro-U.S. and anti-European foreign policies on the continent. Italy became wary also because of precedents of Ukraine’s failure to observe its obligations of transport of natural gas to Western Europe in early 2006;
7) Ukraine’s delays in its struggle for the promising Indian, Chinese, Central and South-East Asian markets due to the lopsided and inefficient orientation of its trade and economic policies exclusively towards the European Union.
As a matter of fact, the gist of Ukrainian foreign policies following the December 2004 coup was to concentrate on Ukraine’s regional specialisation in Eastern Europe and all over the post-Soviet space as agreed upon by the U.S State Department; serving as a frontline unit of the U.S. diplomacy in the promotion of its interests. Ideologically, this policy was accompanied by “the advancement of democratic values” and “the support of democratic revolutions” in the neighbouring countries using GUAM and Organisation for the Democratic Choice as its weapon.
Exactly the efficiency of Ukrainian activities along the lines of the said specialisation and the demonstration by “the orange” authorities of their stability were to be the condition for the Ukrainian NATO entry. Hence the highly debatable and scandalous acts perpetuated by Kiev, including the blockade of the TDMR, interference into Belorussia’s internal affairs by way of assessing the character of presidential elections, etc.
Given that U.S. interests in the CIS are totally different to Russian national interests at all, the pro-American policies pursued by Ukraine inevitably plunged it into rabid and more often than not irrational confrontations with Russia. Permanent provocations and scandals involving deployment of the Russian Black Sea fleet in the Crimea, revision of the conditions of cooperation in the power field, diplomatic and humanitarian demarches (like the ban on the entry to Ukraine for a number of Russian citizens, etc).
The course of confrontation with Russia was for Yushchenko-led rightist nationalist forces important also due to more general considerations. The demonstrative alienation from Russia, and assumed sorting out its relations with Russian authorities till now remain a way of proving of the new Ukrainian statehood for a certain part of the Ukrainian political elite. Hence the obsession over the all-round competition with Russia even in areas where rationales of common sense and profitability call for a close cooperation and collaboration (including integration into the Single Economic Space [SES] and the Eurasian Economic Union, or coordinated position with Russia on the issues of WTO entry and collaboration with the European Union).
The Cabinet led by Viktor Yanukovich will inevitably have to change the concept of Ukraine’s foreign policies as the movement in the formerly planned direction prevents it from solving a single substantial problem. The new concept of foreign policies should undoubtedly take into account the outlook and orientation of the majority of the Ukrainian population that regards itself as part of the Russian and Eurasian space rather than that of the Euro-Atlantic cultural space. The aborted attempts to foster “the European identity” in Ukrainians and the total failure of the pro-NATO propaganda prompt such a revision. The Ukrainian pro-NATO course would inevitably be anti-Russian, and in essence, the anti-Russian course would always be anti-Ukrainian.
For the Cabinet under Yanukovich the specificity of Ukrainian foreign policies on the Russian direction will be linked to the principal changes in the Russian policies towards the CIS nations. If previously Moscow accepted the multi-vector character of the policies pursued by the post-Soviet states on condition of absence of the expressed anti-Russian course, criteria of friendship are now evidently different, becoming tougher and having a single meaning that is adequate to the notion “a friendly nation”. One of the important factors of this change was the Euro-Atlantic slant of Ukraine’s foreign policies after 2004, representing a logical end to their multi-vector policies pursued in the previous years.
It was exactly during Leonid Kuchma’s presidential term that the agenda, which included the issue of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration, was worked out. “The orange” people made this plan a reality. Grabbing the levers of authority they showed that an influential Euro-Atlantic trend was formed that had its program anti-Russia and anti-Russian slogans.
Most likely Moscow would no longer view the return of the Yanukovich government to the multi-vector policies of the Kuchma presidency as an acceptable line in bilateral relations and a demonstration of good-neighbourliness. Difficulties of two types lurk before Yanukovich on the road of improvement of the Ukraine-Russia relations.
First, it is unclear how deeply Yanukovich understands the gist of new demands to the course of Ukrainian foreign policies in general, and on the Russian direction in particular. In any case, the Ukrainian side should begin working on such an improvement coming up from issues other than natural gas supply. Discussion of gas prices should follow – as a conditio sine qua non – the lifting of the status of persona non grata for all Russian citizens, an end to provocations involving the Black Sea fleet and installing conditions for its normal activities, including terms of re-armament, and the resumption by Ukraine of its activities in the establishment of the SES.
Second, the new government faces problems rooted in domestic policies, too. On the one hand the government has to take into consideration the President’s point of view of the issues of foreign policies that proved a stumbling block for Yushchenko who took his time to consider Yanukovich’s appointment as Prime Minister. On the other, the government has to implement the anti-NATO programme that helped the Party of the Regions (PR) win at the recent elections and that meets the expectations of the Russian political leadership.
Yanukovich’s striving to live up to his pre-election promises would inevitably fan his confrontation with Yushchenko’s rightist nationalist supporters. The PR has already proved its ability to value the opinion of its electorate, so another conflict with the President and those around him over the principal issues of foreign policies may be just around the corner. However, some analysts are still dubious about the capacities of Yanukovich personally and his party on the whole to stand the defence of principal foreign policy issues, also due to the presence in his party of a number of influence centres and different groups of interest.
The powerful factors that help support the new government in its striving to establish a new quality of relations with the Russian Federation include, first, the fact that the PR sees its political future as that linked to the world of Russians and genuine Ukrainian interests that do not contradict Russia’s interests, and second, the need to bring order to the economy with an eye at improving macroeconomic indices as soon as possible. The political future of the PR itself depends on that, given it has to prove its competence in the struggle with two dangerous opponents, “Our Ukraine” and the Yulia Timoshenko Bloc. Successful competition with them is impossible in the absence of a rapid revitalization of the economy, which is conditioned, first, by maintaining industrial cooperation and expansion of trade and economic ties with Russia in the military and technical area, gaining an access for Ukrainian goods to Russian markets and the markets of the other SES players, a favourable price-fixing for Russian spare parts for the high-tech branches of Ukrainian industry, especially its defence sector, energy carriers, etc.
Weakening of Ukrainian pro-U.S. orientation and strengthening its pro-Russian as well as pro-European orientation is likely to come in the near future. Kiev’s European policies should be totally reconsidered to be based on a realistic basis and freed from the utopian goal of gaining the EU membership. This is the first condition of establishing normal constructive relations with the EU member-states. The second condition is Ukraine’s new positioning on the European continent, including its re-orientation from the role of the U.S. frontline stronghold in Eastern Europe towards the role of a reliable partner of primarily – major West European countries – Germany, France, Spain and Italy. That presupposes a reshuffle of the hierarchy of its partners, whereby along with maintaining truly friendly relations with Russia, it should re-consider its relations of partnership with “the old” Europe, while relations with the Central European and Baltic states having pro-U.S. and anti-Russian (which are few) are to come second if not third.
Reorientation of the kind is also needed for expansion of export to Russia and Europe of Ukraine’s main budget-forming branches of economy. Primarily, including output of the metal-smelting, chemical; and defence industries. Thus, rationales of economic expediency also urge the new Ukrainian government to drastically re-consider priorities of Ukraine’s foreign policies.